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Abstract
A large literature has documented that the unemployment duration of unemployment
insurance (UI) recipient increases with the generosity of the UI system. This has been
interpreted as the disincentive effect of UI benefits, however, unemployed workers typically
also have caseworkers assigned who are monitoring and assisting the job search efforts. These
caseworkers may respond to differences in UI eligibility by shifting resources (financial or
time) between unemployed individuals in order to counteract the moral hazard effect of UI
benefits or in order to focus resources to where they have the largest effect. This suggests
that the typical estimates of the disincentive effects of UI may be biased in studies that
compare workers within the same UI agency. We estimate whether caseworkers respond
to the generosity of UI using a regression discontinuity (RD) design in Germany, where
potential UI durations vary with age. We show that across a wide variety of measures, such
as meetings, sanctions, and training programs UI caseworkers do not treat unemployed with
different eligibility differently. At best we find a very small effect that workers with shorter
eligibility close to the exhaustion point are more likely to be assigned to training programs
that prolong their UI eligibility. The typical RD estimates of the UI disincentive effects thus
seem to be valid estimates.
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A large literature has documented that unemployed workers who face more generous un-
employment insurance (UI) benefit levels and eligibility durations take longer to return to
employment. This has typically been interpreted as the moral hazard effect of UI benefits1,
where individuals respond to the reduction in the marginal benefit of finding a job relative
to remaining unemployed by lowering their search effort. Unemployed workers, however, are
also influenced by caseworkers of the UI agencies, who are typically tasked with monitor-
ing job search effort as well as with providing various types of support to the unemployed,
such as job referrals, various active labor market programs or advice and motivation. Since
caseworkers have limited resources in terms of time, financial means for active labor market
programs and vacancies that they can refer workers to, they may respond to differences in
UI eligibility across workers by targeting their efforts. If these efforts then have a direct
effect on unemployment durations, this could lead to substantial biases in estimates of the
disincentive effects of UI benefits. Some of the most convincing empirical estimates of the
effect of UI eligibility are based on regression discontinuity designs (Lalive et al., 2006; Card
et al., 2007a; Lalive, 2008; Schmieder et al., 2012a) and regression kink designs (Landais,
2015; Card et al., 2015a,b). However, these are precisely the settings where the potential
bias from caseworker responses to UI eligibility may be particularly severe, since these de-
signs effectively compare workers in the same labor market and plausibly within the same
caseworker.
In this paper we provide the first estimates whether UI caseworkers respond to differences
in UI eligibility across unemployed workers. We use the fact that in Germany potential UI
benefit durations are a function of the exact age of claiming UI benefits where durations
increase discontinuously from 12 to 15 months at age 50. As has been shown in other
studies (Schmieder et al., 2012a, 2016) for earlier time periods in Germany, this discontinuity
gives rise to a substantial decrease in job finding hazards and a corresponding increase in
unemployment durations. Using the universe of social security data in Germany merged to
a unique new dataset on active labor market program participation, caseworker activities
(such as personal meetings with the unemployed, the signing of integration contract, and
vacancy referrals), and sanctions, we analyze whether caseworkers respond to the increase
1Or a combination of a moral hazard and income effect (Chetty 2008).
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in UI eligibility at the age threshold. An important aspect of the empirical analysis is that
while UI eligibility is determined at the start of the UI spell, caseworkers interact with the
unemployed throughout the entire unemployment spell and may assign them into different
programs at various points in time. In the empirical part we therefore carefully deal with
this dynamic aspect of the caseworker actions and we present both cross-sectional results -
showing the effect of UI eligibility on total program participation and caseworker interactions
- as well as dynamic results, showing the effect by month since the start of the UI spell.
A priori, UI eligibility can affect how caseworkers allocate their resources in various ways,
depending on the objective function of the caseworker as well as the effectiveness of the
resources the caseworker has at her disposition. For example, caseworkers might be trying
to minimize the average time until their assigned cases get back to work. If assignment
into active labor market programs increases the job finding rate among the unemployed,
then the caseworker would focus these resources on workers who are most responsive to
these programs, which might be individuals with shorter durations who have more to gain
from participating in these programs, or it might be individuals with longer UI durations,
perhaps because the threat of a training program might be particularly effective for them
to overcome the larger disincentive effect from UI. Similarly, other caseworker instruments
like sanctions, monitoring or wage subsidies might be complements or substitutes with UI
benefits which could lead to positive or negative correlations between caseworker activities
and UI generosity. Furthermore, caseworkers might also have other objective functions,
which can also have ambiguous effects on how they allocate their resources. For example
caseworkers might be maximizing something like a Rawlsian social welfare function and thus
attempt to focus their resources on the person with lower UI benefits in order to compensate
them for the disadvantage of lower benefits. Furthermore caseworkers could be focused on
assigning workers to active labor market programs (ALMP) who are most likely to find a
job afterwards (with or without the training program), thus leading to the appearance that
the program was successful.2 In short, depending on the type of caseworker instrument,
the objective function of the caseworker, and the complementarity between UI benefits and
caseworker actions, the effect of UI generosity on caseworker actions is ambiguous. In the
next section, we will lay out these various ways caseworkers might be motivated to allocate
2See Heckman et al. (1997) and Bell and Orr (2002) for evidence and discussion of such a “creaming”
effect in training programs.
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their resources and derive some empirical tests from them.
The paper is related to the large literature on the effectiveness of active labor market
programs and other dimensions of caseworker actions. Card et al. (2010) and Card et al.
(2015c) provide an excellent overview of the literature. While results are heterogeneous across
studies and some programs, such as public employment programs, may not be particularly
effective, others, such as job search assistance and some training programs, seem to succeed
in getting workers back into jobs over the short or medium run. Other papers (e.g. Berg et
al., 2004; Abbring et al., 2005; Lalive et al., 2005; Svarer, 2007; Arni and Schiprowski, 2016),
have evaluated the use of sanctions and found that they are quite successful in increasing
transition rates back into employment. In a recent paper, Schiprowski (2018), shows that
simply meeting with a caseworker has a positive effect on job finding rates in the Swiss UI
system. A growing body of research has also documented that often the threat of being sent
to a training program may be enough to induce individuals to return to work, thus seemingly
serving as a monitoring device (e.g. Black et al., 2003; Giulietti et al., 2011). Overall, there
is substantial evidence on the effectiveness of different caseworker actions, but less is known
about the motivations and goals of caseworkers. Boockmann et al. (2013) provide survey
evidence on caseworkers’ motivations and strategies, but do not analyze quantitatively what
factors influence caseworker actions. In contrast we investigate whether caseworkers respond
to specific institutional features of the UI system, using a well defined natural experiment.
This paper complements the research estimating the disincentive effects of UI benefits.
While this is a long line of research (with early seminal papers such as Moffitt, 1985 or
Meyer, 1990), it has received a lot of new interest with the advent of large administrative
datasets and the rise of econometric methods like regression discontinuity (e.g. Lalive, 2008;
Lalive et al., 2006; Card et al., 2007a; Schmieder et al., 2012a,b; Johnston and Mas, 2015)
and - more recently - regression kink designs (Landais, 2015; Card et al., 2015a,b).3 The
advantage of these designs is that they exploit policy features to isolate variation in UI gen-
erosity which is plausibly orthogonal to individual characteristics (observed and unobserved)
and uncorrelated with other policy parameters, in many ways almost mimicking a random-
ized controlled trial. However these papers do not observe to what extent caseworkers and
employment agencies themselves are responding to the policy variation by shifting various
resources between different groups of workers. The nature of these designs suggests that the
3See Schmieder and Von Wachter (2016) for a review of this recent literature.
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workers in the implicit treatment and control groups may well be assigned to the same case-
worker, which implies that the problem of bias from caseworker actions may be particularly
severe. Without information on caseworker activities it is impossible to gauge the possi-
ble magnitude from this bias, however the possibility that actions by intermediaries (with
good intentions) may severely complicate the interpretation of differences between individu-
als with different ’treatments’ has been recognized since the early days of statistical research
such as in Student’s (1931) famous critique of the Lanarkshire milk experiment. The main
contribution of this paper is therefore to analyze the validity of the implicit assumption in
these studies that caseworker actions are not confounding the estimates of the disincentive
effects of UI, at least in the specific context that we are studying here.
The next section will discuss a simple framework for understanding the role of casework-
ers and how they may bias estimates of the disincentive effects of UI. Section 3 provides
institutional background on the role of UI caseworkers in Germany and describes our data.
In section 4 we show based on what characteristics the unemployed are assigned to case-
worker teams and provides evidence that such teams are resource constraint. In section 5 we
explain our empirical method based on an age discontinuity in Germany, provide evidence
that this gives rise to a valid regression discontinuity design and present the main empirical
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We describe a simple stylized framework here to illustrate how the actions of caseworkers
may bias estimates of the disincentive effects of UI and what would determine the direction
of the bias. Consider a world where individuals i are unemployed at the beginning of the
(single) period. The unemployed search for a job and choose search effort ei for which they
face a cost of ψ(ei). If they do find a job, they immediately start working and receive a wage
w, otherwise they are unemployed for the period and receive UI benefits bi, which may vary
across individuals. The utility function is given as u(.). Workers are subject to ’treatment’
by a caseworker measured as ωi, which encompasses any kind of actions at the disposal of
the caseworker, such as job search monitoring, vacancy referrals or ALMP. Furthermore the
probability si of finding a job is a function of effort and caseworker resources: si = s(ei, ωi).
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Workers are maximizing expected utility:
Vi = max
ei
s(ei, ωi)u(w) + (1− s(ei, ωi))u(bi)− ψ(ei)
The first order condition for the worker is
∂s(ei, ωi)
∂ei
(u(w)− u(bi))− ψ′(ei) = 0
This function implicitly defines an optimal search effort function ξ(bi, ωi), so that workers
are finding a job with probability:
si = s (ξ (bi, ωi) , ωi) ≡ s̃(bi, ωi) (1)
Consider the following linear approximation of equation (1):
si = η bi + π ωi +Xiβ + εi (2)
The empirical literature focusing on the disincentive effect of UI typically estimates a version
of equation (2) that omits the ωi-term in order to identify a parameter such as η, the effect of
UI benefits on the job finding hazard.4 Typical estimation strategies such as RDD or RKD
are focused on isolating variation (by selecting appropriate samples and controlsXi) such that
Cov(bi, εi|Xi) = 0. However, if caseworkers allocate resources across unemployed workers
taking bi into account this would lead to Cov(ωi, bi|Xi) 6= 0. In this case, as highlighted by
equation (2), not controlling for ωi will lead to an omitted variable bias when estimating η.
Suppose the allocation of resources among the unemployed can be described using the
following linear model:
ωi = δ bi +Xiγ + εi (3)
If δ 6= 0, then estimation of equation (2) without controlling for ωi will lead to a biased
estimate of η. The sign of δ (and π) will determine the sign and the magnitude of this bias.
To see what kind of values δ might plausibly take, consider a situation where each case-
worker is assigned two unemployed individuals i = 1, 2. Furthermore the overall amount of
4There are papers analyzing the effect of ALMP on unemployment durations that include UI eligibility
as a control variable but the empirical design in these papers typically does not allow for interpreting this
parameter causally.
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resources (time, money, vacancies, ...) of the caseworker are limited to R = ω1 + ω2. The
caseworker chooses an allocation of his resources to maximize an objective function subject
to this budget constraint:
max
ω1,ω2
= W (ω1, ω2) s.t. R = ω1 + ω2
How caseworkers allocate their resources will depend crucially on the objective function
W , as well as on how resources actually affect the unemployed. We will consider several
stylized cases and highlight in each of these cases how resource allocation would be correlated
with benefit levels.
First, consider the unemployment-minimizer, who wants to reduce average unem-
ployment durations as much as possible. Such a caseworker can be described as maximizing
the objective function W (ω1, ω2) = s1+ s2 = s̃(b1, ω1)+ s̃(b2, ω2). If bi and ωi are substitutes
in s̃(.), that is if ∂2s̃
∂bi∂ωi
< 0, then at the optimum ωi will be negatively related to UI bene-
fits. On the other hand if bi and ωi are complements, they will be positively related. The
assumption of substitutes may be plausible in the case of job search monitoring or sanctions:
a worker with low UI benefits may already be searching relatively hard for jobs, with little
additional increase in the job finding probability if he is monitored or sanctioned more, while
a worker with high UI benefit levels may be more responsive. On the other hand bi and ωi
may plausibly be complements in the case of training programs or wage subsidies. A worker
who is very motivated (due to low UI payments) may be more willing to learn new skills in a
training program or to look for jobs where he might benefit from a wage subsidy. Therefore
if caseworkers are trying to minimize overall unemployment durations, this would lead to a
correlation between benefit generosity and caseworker resources, where the sign will depend
on the search effort function of the worker.
Next, consider the caseworker who wants to maximize perceived resource efficiency,
where we define perceived resource efficiency as the unconditional correlation between the
job finding probability and caseworker resources. The idea is that a naive principal who
is overlooking the caseworker might use this correlation as a simple measure for whether
caseworkers are using their resources efficiently. The German UI agency for example regularly
publishes statistics (on the level of local UI agencies) of the fraction of people who are
participating in ALMP who then find a job within a year. Such an objective function can
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be expressed as: W (ω1, ω2) = s1ω1 + s2ω2. With such an objective function the caseworker
would - at least to a first order approximation - simply focus resources to the person where
s̃(bi, ωi) is the highest, which may (though not necessarily) be the opposite of what the
unemployment-minimizer would do. Since search effort is decreasing in bi, this would tend
to generate a negative association with caseworker resources.
Third, consider the welfarist caseworker, who is maximizing a social welfare function
defined over individual utilities of the unemployed. This could include a Rawlsian social
welfare function such as: W = min{V1(ω1), V2(ω2)} or a Utilitarian social welfare function
such as: W = V1(ω1) + V2(ω2). In the Rawlsian case, the caseworker would tend to focus
resources on the disadvantaged unemployed with low UI benefits, leading again to a negative
relationship between bi and ωi, while in the Utilitarian case the sign is ambiguous and,
depending on whether bi and ωi are complements or substitutes, may go in the opposite
direction.
Finally, consider the bureaucratic caseworker, who simply follows guidelines (explicit
or implicit) where resources are allocated according to observable worker characteristics Xi.
For example all workers are treated equally, or workers are supported / monitored purely
based on observable characteristics such as age, education, qualification etc. In this case we
have that: Cov(ωi, bi|Xi) = 0, and the typical estimates of η would not be biased.
The main goal of this paper is to provide consistent estimates of δ in equation (3), which
will then allow us to estimate the bias from estimating equation (2) without controlling for
ωi. Furthermore, as can be seen from the discussion, the sign of δ is informative about the
objective function of the caseworkers and may provide insights into the likely complementar-
ity of ωi and bi in the search effort function. It should be noted that in practice caseworker
resources are a vector with many components and that it is certainly possible that casework-
ers have differing objectives for different resources and that the complementarity between
ωi and bi varies across different types of caseworker actions. We will get back to this in the
interpretation of our empirical results.
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3 Institutional Background and Data
3.1 Unemployment Insurance in Germany
Workers in Germany are eligible to receive UI benefits if they are unemployed and have been
employed for at least 12 months in the previous two years. The replacement rate is 60 percent
of the pre-unemployment wage (67 percent if the person has children) up to a wage of 5300
Euro per month in 2008.5 Eligibility duration depends on the number of months worked in
the previous 5 years before claiming UI benefits, as well as the age at the time of claiming.
From 2008 onwards, the maximum potential benefit duration (PBD) of UI was 12 months
for individuals below age 50 at the time of claiming UI benefits, 15 months for individuals
age 50 to 54, 18 months for individuals age 55 to 57 and 22 months for individuals age 58
and older.6 We will focus on workers who are close to the age 50 threshold when they claim
UI benefits and who have worked for at least 30 months in the previous 5 years so that they
are eligible to the maximum benefit duration.7
After individuals exhaust UI benefits the unemployed can apply for a means tested second
tier benefit level called UI benefits II (UIB II).8 The monthly benefits in this second tier
program are around 370 Euro per person in addition to rent and health insurance. Individuals
who are working while receiving UIB II face implicit marginal tax rates of around 90 percent.
Depending on pre-unemployment income, asset levels and possibly spousal income, benefit
levels in UIB II may be anywhere between substantially lower than regular UI benefits to
quite similar.
Workers who quit their jobs, lose them at their own fault, or fail to register for job search
prior to the UI claim may be subject to sanctions of varying durations, that is periods where
5The cap is lower in East Germany and increases over time, roughly at the inflation rate. The maximum
wage that counts for UI benefit calculations is located approximately at the 85th percentile of the wage
distribution, but rarely binding for the unemployed who typically come from lower paid jobs.
6The maximum PBD is the maximum duration someone can be eligible for at the beginning of the spell.
This maximum can implicitly increase throughout the spell through participation in active labor market
programs, since while in such a program the unemployed continue to receive UI benefits, but use up only 1
day of PBD per 2 days of program participation. We will get back to this in the empirical section.
7Below age 50, working for 24 months in the previous 5 years would be enough to qualify for the maximum
of 12 months of benefits, but in order to have a comparable sample we impose the 30 months requirement
on both sides of the cutoff. If individuals had UI spells in the previous 5 years the clock for calculating UI
benefits would be reset and we therefore require that they have worked for at least 30 months since the end
of that UI spell.
8UIB II was introduced during the Hartz reforms in 2003/2004 which merged the older systems of unem-
ployment benefits and unemployment assistance. See Eichhorst and Marx (2011) for a detailed description
of the reforms.
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they do not receive UI benefits. We restrict our sample to individuals who receive UI benefits
within less than 3 months after job separation, which excludes individuals with sanctions
due to voluntary quits.
3.2 Caseworkers
Unemployed individuals are required to register for job search when they get notified of
a lay-off and have to appear at their local employment agency (Arbeitsagentur) in order
to apply for UI benefits before they can claim them.9 At the first appointment they are
assigned a caseworker whose task it is to process the benefit application, to advise and
support the unemployed on job search, and to monitor job search efforts. Support can come
in the form of simply discussing potential job options and application strategies, as well as
by offering participation in active labor market programs (such as training programs, public
employment programs or wage subsidies for potential jobs). Employment agencies also offer
a platform for vacancy postings and they are used directly by employers to look for job
candidates. Caseworkers have access to vacancies offered by employers and may refer them
to specific unemployed workers. Apart from these supportive measures caseworkers monitor
job search and can sanction individuals with benefit cuts if they fail to comply with search
requirements. The duration of these cuts varies from one week (for example for delayed
job search registration) to up to twelve weeks (for voluntary job quits). Sanctions are also
used to punish unemployed that do not use the offered support by the caseworker. Refusing
to participate in an active labor market program, canceling a started program or rejecting
a vacancy referral can be punished with a benefits cut of three weeks. Lack of individual
initiative in looking for a job can be punished with a cut of two weeks. The duration of
benefit cuts increases with the number of sanctions. For example, the first two times a
worker refuses a vacancy referral benefits are cut for three weeks, but this goes up to twelve
weeks after the third refusal. Benefit cuts from different sanctions are additive up to a total
duration of benefit cuts of 21 weeks, when benefits are cut completely (see Hofmann, 2012).
During the first meeting the caseworker assesses how easy it will be for the unemployed
to find back into employment and assigns them to one of various profiles. These profiles may
then be used to guide integration strategies by the local UI agency, though there is a lot of
9There are 160 employment agency districts, each comprising around 2-3 counties. Typically there is one
central agency in a district as well as several smaller local branches.
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freedom remaining how caseworkers may use them. Caseworkers and unemployed typically
meet in regular intervals to discuss job search progress, devise new application strategies and,
potentially, to monitor search efforts by the unemployed. The frequency of these meetings
is up to the caseworker.10
Since the Hartz Reforms, caseworkers and the unemployed are required to sign a so-called
integration contract (see Schütz et al., 2011), an agreement that specifies the expectations
of what the unemployed worker is supposed to do each week in order to find a job as well as
the support she gets from the caseworker. On the worker side, it can for example specify the
number of applications she agrees to send in a given time. On the caseworker side, it can
specify the funding of a targeted training program or to cover costs related to the application
process. The contract usually specifies the target occupation and task, as well as the regional
area in which the worker is looking for jobs. These contracts are legally binding for both
sides and are supposed to be updated every six months.
Caseworkers have a variety of active labor market programs at their disposal. We ana-
lyzed a wide range of programs (all with similar results) but focus on the two largest types
of programs during our time period: training programs and job placement services. Training
programs encompass a range of programs designed to teach workers how to find a job or
to help them acquire new job related skills. This ranges from short job coaching seminars
focused on job applications and what types of jobs a worker may be qualified for all the
way to longer vocational training programs (up to 10 months), similar to apprenticeships in
that they combine education in a vocational school with practical experience in workplaces.
Job placement services are external providers (that is firms that contract with the Federal
Employment Agency) of job search assistance that provide a range of services to help workers
find jobs through individual coaching and mentoring.
Local UI agencies organize caseworkers into teams and UI recipients are first assigned to
both a team and a specific caseworker within a team. The role of the teams is to coordinate
work between the caseworkers, to fill in for absences of caseworkers, and they may have joint
resource constraints. We will discuss the role of these teams and how workers are assigned
to them in more detail in the next section.
10This is consistent with a wide range of meeting frequencies that we find between unemployed individuals




We use data from the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) of the German Social
Security system, which covers all social security liable employment relationships in Germany
as well as information on unemployment benefits and registered job search status. We extract
a sample of all individuals who enter UI between April 2008 and June 2010 who are between
age 45 and 55 at the age of claiming UI and who are eligible to the maximum benefit duration
of their age group.11 For the main regression analysis we furthermore restrict the sample to
a 2 year window around the age cutoff. For each UI spell we know the duration of receiving
UI benefits, the duration of registered job search and nonemployment duration, that is time
until the next employment spell that is covered in the dataset.12 Furthermore we have
information on participation in active labor market programs, and can infer sanctions from
UI benefit spells where no benefits are paid.
We supplement the IEB with 3 additional data sources. First we obtained information
on direct interactions with caseworkers along three dimensions: invitations for person ap-
pointments at the local UI agency, vacancy referrals and integration contracts.13 Second,
we also obtained data on the integration profile assignments by the caseworkers. Finally we
obtained identifiers for the teams that UI recipients were assigned to.14
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the main characteristics of our sample. Column
1 shows the full sample of all UI claims of individuals aged 48 to 51 at the time of claiming,
including individuals who have shorter eligibility durations which we do not use for our RD
sample. Column 2 shows the sample restricted to individuals in our RD sample, that is
individuals who have worked for at least 30 months in the preceding 5 years. We lose around
10 percent of the observations, but most characteristics remain very similar. The restricted
sample is somewhat more positively selected with higher pre- and post-unemployment wages.
Splitting the analysis sample into individuals above (column 3)and below (column 4) the age
cutoff reveals differences between the two age groups that, as we will show later, are driven by
11Our data reaches until the end of 2012. We start in April of 2008 to avoid some manipulation that
occurred right around the January 2008 reform where people seemed to have delayed UI claiming until the
reform. Using inflows until June 2010 allows us to observe all individuals for at least 18 months within our
time window and thus for the entire covered UI spell for the workers above the threshold.
12In particular self-employment as well as some government jobs are not subject to social security contri-
butions and not included in the data.
13More information on these variables is available in Hofmann and Köhler (2014).
14Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain identifiers for the individual caseworkers nor the number of
caseworkers that are part of a team.
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age gradients, highlighting the importance of isolating the variation at the age discontinuity.
4 Caseworker Team Assignments and Team Resource Constraints
4.1 The Assignment of Unemployed Workers to Caseworker Teams
Based on conversations with caseworkers, it appears that the formation of teams varies
substantially across UI agencies and can take different forms. For example in some UI
agencies teams may specialize on different geographic regions (say different cities within
the UI agency district), in others teams may be formed to specialize on different education
levels of the UI recipients (high vs. low skill) or different industries (manufacturing vs.
service). Finally, there may be UI agencies where teams are not particularly specialized and
simply serve as a way of organizing caseworkers into smaller administrative units. We are
not aware of systematic studies or data sources about how teams are formed at the local
level. To investigate this we created a dataset consisting of all UI inflows from April 2008 to
June 2010 and calculated average Team-by-Quarter characteristics of the new UI claimants.
There is quite a bit of heterogeneity in team sizes with most teams having around 100 to 500
new UI claimants each quarter. The average unemployed in our sample is in a team with a
total of around 360 UI inflows per quarter, around 73 of which are in the age range of 45 to
55. (See Table 1)
Using this team level dataset, we calculated a number of statistics, such as Dissimilarity
Indices and Intra Class Coefficients to gauge whether the assignment of workers within UI
agencies to individual teams appears to be random or systematic. We provide details of these
tests in the Online Appendix but the key take-away is that the assignment is clearly not
random and there is substantial sorting among observable characteristics such as education,
pre-unemployment wages and age.
Given the structure of, often, specialized teams, it is not surprising that UI recipients are
not randomly assigned to caseworkers or teams. Regarding our research question, a related
important question is therefore whether workers are systematically assigned to different case-
workers or different teams above and below the age cutoff and whether this could potentially
explain different job finding rates around the threshold. Given the nonrandom assignment
to teams, this seems ex-ante quite possible. In order to investigate this, we calculated for
each worker the average characteristics of the other individuals in their team excluding the
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worker herself, i.e. the leave-out-mean of these variables.
Figure 1 shows RD figures around the age threshold using our analysis sample and show-
ing leave-out-means of Team-by-Quarter UI inflow characteristics as dependent variables.
Suppose for example that workers on the right of the age threshold were systematically as-
signed to different teams, for example if some teams consisted only of workers above age 50,
then we would expect the average team age to jump discontinuously at the age threshold.
Figure 1 a) suggests that this is not the case as workers just above or below age 50 are in
teams with the same average age. Similarly the other Panels in Figure 1 show that the team
composition of workers above and below the age threshold are virtually identical with no
discernible jump in demographics or job search outcomes at the threshold.
This shows that even though team assignment (and thus likely caseworker assignment)
is nonrandom, teams are not formed systematically by age of the UI claimants in a way that
would lead UI claimants above and below the age threshold to be in different teams. This is
also in line with the fact that around 97% of workers are in teams that have UI claimants
above and below age 50 (Table 1).
4.2 Are Caseworkers Resource Constrained?
Another key question is whether caseworkers do in fact face resource constraints. If case-
workers had unlimited resources in terms of funding for ALMP, vacancies that they can refer
workers to and time for meetings, monitoring etc. then we would not expect UI eligibility
to affect the amount of resources a worker receives from their caseworker. Since we do not
observe caseworker identifiers, we analyze the question of resource constraints at the team
level. If teams are facing resource constraints, then we would expect that the average re-
sources workers receive from their caseworkers is negatively related to the total caseload of
the team. We test this by estimating the following regression on the team level:
ln(yit) = ln(caseloadit) + θi + γt +Xit + εit
where yit is an outcome variable such as the average number of vacancy referrals a worker
received per month in team i at time (in quarters) t. caseloadit is the number of UI inflows in
team i at time t. We control for team fixed effects θi and time fixed effects γt. Since caseload
may be correlated with the type of workers who become unemployed we also show results
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where we control for the composition of the UI claimants using a vector of demographics Xit,
such as the share of women among new UI claimants in team i at time t, average education
and similar variables.
Table 2 shows results from these regressions. Panel A shows that there is a clear negative
relationship: as the number of UI claimants rise in a team, the number of referrals decreases.
The estimate is a bit smaller when we control for observable worker characteristics but the
point estimate still negative and highly statistically significant. Similarly, Panel B and C
show that a larger caseload also reduces the number of invitations workers receive as well
as the incidence of an integration contract. The last two panels focus on the biggest active
labor market programs. Both the number of days in education programs and the number of
days a worker spends in a placement program is significantly reduced as UI inflows increase.
These regressions suggest that caseworker teams that face larger caseloads spend less
time and resources on individual workers and presumably have to make decisions regarding
how to allocate their scarce resources.15
There are two key takeaways from this section: First: workers above and below the age
threshold are on average in the same teams and most teams do in fact have workers on
both sides of the cutoff. Furthermore teams do appear to be resource constrained, and thus
forced to make decisions about how to allocate scarce resources. This seems to make it ex
ante plausible that caseworkers would base these allocations in part on the potential benefit
duration of the unemployed, which we will investigate in the next section.
5 The Effect of UI Extensions on Worker and Caseworker Behavior
5.1 The Regression Discontinuity Design
The main contribution of this paper is to provide estimates of whether caseworkers respond
to differences in UI generosity across workers by allocating their resources differently. To
do so we estimate variants of equation (3), with various measures of caseworker actions as
outcome variables. To obtain credible identification we exploit the sharp age cutoff at age
50 in order to estimate the effect of UI generosity using a standard regression discontinuity
15Note, that while we think these regressions suggest that there are resource constraints, the caseload is
obviously correlated with local labor market conditions and therefore, as tempting as it is, we do not believe
this would be a good instrument to estimate the causal effect of these resources on job search outcomes.
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design:
yi = β + δ1(ai ≥ 50) + f(ai) + θjt + εi (4)
where yi is an outcome for individual i, ai is the age of i at the time of claiming UI benefits
measured in days and f(.) is a function controlling for the effect of age. We estimate this
equation locally around the cutoff using a linear spline specification for f(.) with different
slopes on each side of the cutoff. The coefficient δ captures the extent to which caseworkers
act differently toward the high-UI eligible unemployed. θjt represents a vector of team j by
quarter t fixed effects. We include these in order to focus on the comparison between workers
with high and low UI eligibility within the same caseworker team, where resource constraints
may be most relevant. In practice this makes virtually no difference and we show results
without controlling for team-quarter FE, as well as when including additional controls in the
online appendix.
Since we are particularly interested in whether caseworker actions may lead to bias in
estimating the disincentives effects of UI (as in equation 2), we also show that there is in
fact a significant effect of UI generosity on unemployment durations by estimating equation
(4) with measures of job finding rates and unemployment durations as dependent variables.
Validity of the RD Design. There are two main reasons why the exclusion restriction
may be violated in our situation. First, workers might systematically delay claiming UI
benefits in order to be eligible for the longer potential UI durations. For example a worker
who is laid off 1 week before their 50th birthday could wait 1 week in order to be eligible
for an additional 3 months of UI benefits.16 Second, there may be systematically higher
inflows (and possibly of different types) at higher potential UI durations, e.g. because firms
are systematically more likely to lay off workers with higher UI eligibility. We test for these
possible violations using the standard RD diagnostic figures that are included in the online
appendix. The density of UI inflows exhibits a small dip in the density in a 2 week window to
the left of the age threshold and a little bit of extra mass just to the right. This is consistent
with a small amount of claim delaying around the cutoff but only of about 200 people out
of a sample of around 100,000 observations. It is consistent with the incentives to delay UI
benefits, that this should mainly occur very close to the cutoff. To make sure that these
16The incentives for delayed claiming were discussed in detail in Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender
(2012), both in the main text and the online appendix.
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delaying workers do not affect our results, we exclude one month at each side of the cutoff
in our baseline specification as a cautionary measure.
There also appears to be a small (1-2%) increase in the level of inflows to the right of the
cutoff when we exclude observations in a 1 month window around the cutoff, which could
be due to slightly higher layoff rates for older workers. To see whether this could be a sign
for different selection of workers around the cutoff, we also tested for smoothness of prede-
termined worker characteristics at the cutoff. Despite a large N and precise estimates, these
are all very smooth and do not suggest any selection around the threshold. Furthermore, we
also estimated all of the specifications reported below controlling for a wide set of observable
characteristics (available in the appendix), which had virtually no effect on the results.
5.2 The Disincentive Effect of UI
Figure 2 a) shows the average UI benefit duration by age of claiming UI. There is a clear
discontinuous jump of about 1 month at the age 50 threshold, when UI eligibility increases
from 12 to 15 months. This increase is partly mechanical - due to the increased coverage - and
partly due to behavioral responses - since unemployed individuals exit unemployment slower.
Figure 2 b) shows that nonemployment duration, which isolates the behavioral response, also
shows a clear jump by about 0.2 months.17 These results are confirmed in Table 3: overall the
increase in potential UI durations at the age 50 threshold has a clear statistically significant
effect on unemployment durations. The magnitude of the coefficient estimate for UI benefit
duration is very similar to the results that Schmieder et al. (2012a) found for the earlier age
cutoffs in the 1980s to early 2000s. The point estimates for unemployment duration are not
quite comparable due to the shorter top-coding but in a similar ballpark.
Figure 2 c) shows how the hazard function of leaving unemployment changes at the age
threshold. The figure is based on estimating equation (5) pointwise with an indicator for
exiting in a given period t conditional on still being unemployed at period t. There is a clear
spike in the hazard rate in the month when UI benefits expire. The difference is large and
clearly significant in the months of benefit expiration (that is in the first month after benefits
17Since our data only covers observations until the end of 2011, we topcode all nonemployment duration
spells at 18 months. Based on our work on other age cutoffs, topcoding at such a relatively low value will
underestimate the effect on nonemployment durations, which is why we also show results on the probability
of finding a job within 18 months. Furthermore we report below how the hazard and survivor functions
change at the age cutoff, which are both unaffected by the censoring.
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are cut). The hazard rate for individuals with 12 months of eligibility is also somewhat
larger in the months leading up to month 12, but except for months 8 and 11 the difference
is not statistically significant.18 Figure 2 d) shows the corresponding survivor function. As
suggested by the hazard rate, the survivor functions start to diverge a few months before
benefit exhaustion for the 12 month group and remain different for the remaining period
(though they converge again after month 15).
The results show that the UI extensions are important in practice: individuals above the
threshold benefit significantly from the expanded UI duration and they remain unemployed
longer. This suggests that if caseworkers take UI eligibility into account through any of the
dimensions discussed in section 2, then we should observe differences in caseworker actions
around the age threshold.
5.3 The Effect of UI on Caseworker Interactions
Unemployed workers above the age cutoff remain longer on UI benefits, partly due to the
mechanical effect of increased UI eligibility and partly due to the behavioral effect of lower
exit rates from unemployment when UI benefits increase. Since caseworkers only interact
with workers while (and before) they are receiving UI benefits, there is a mechanical effect
leading to more caseworker interactions with the unemployed who claim benefits above the
age cut-off and thus remain longer on UI.
The fact that the survivor functions shown above are different even before month 12
highlights that comparing caseworker actions throughout the unemployment spell could be
potentially affected by differences in who is unemployed at various unemployment durations
in the two groups. Given that the survivor functions are virtually identical early on in the
spell, we focus on two approaches: First, we calculate caseworker interactions for the period
of 3 months before to 3 months after claiming UI benefits (or until the exit from UI if that
occurs earlier).19 Second, we show dynamic estimates of caseworker interactions at each
point in the unemployment spell. While the latter does not solve the selection problem per
se, it allows us to easily see whether there are differences in caseworker interactions in the
18Analysis of the earlier age cutoffs in Schmieder et al. (2012a) suggest that the fact that the difference in
hazard rates is not statistically significant until month 11 is likely due to the smaller sample size here and
that hazard rates are indeed higher for the shorter eligibility group for most of the UI spell.
19We start three months before UI entry, since workers who know that their job will end are required to
register for job search three months before job loss.
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months when the survivor functions are identical and thus selection bias likely minimal and
is helpful to paint a more complete dynamic picture.
Table 4 presents estimates on how caseworkers interactions at the beginning of the UI
spell vary at the age discontinuity. The top panel focuses on the direct interactions between
caseworkers and unemployed, namely how often the number of times the caseworker invites
the unemployed to a meeting, how often an integration contract is signed and the number
of job referrals the unemployed receives from the caseworker. All three coefficients are very
precisely estimated and very close to zero. For example, on average a UI claimant is invited
1.8 times by a caseworker over the initial UI phase (i.e. until the third month of UI),
while our point estimate implies that at the age discontinuity this increases by around 0.3%
at the cutoff and the 95% confidence intervals are tight enough so that we can rule out
increases of more than 2.3%. The coefficients are similarly precise and small for the number
of signed contracts and the number of job referrals workers receive. The corresponding
RD-plots in Figures 3 a)-c) similarly show no jump at the relevant age cutoff, underscoring
that caseworkers do not respond their assistance with regard to potential UI duration. This
finding is robust with respect to several robustness checks performed in the next section. We
can also observe whether workers are looking for part- or fulltime jobs. Given that this is
recorded by the caseworker as a result of discussing the job search prospects with the worker,
this could also be potentially affected by the caseworker’s perception of the unemployed and
her urgency to find a job due to UI eligibility. Again we find no difference in this outcome
variable at the cutoff.
As an indirect way of testing whether caseworkers may interact differently with the
unemployed who are older than age 50 we can explore the assignment into different labor
market profiles that occurs at the beginning of a UI spell. We begin by collapsing the
different labor market profiles to a single index corresponding to the ordering of the profile
(the profile that corresponds to workers with the highest expected job finding probability
receives a value of 1 and the profile with the lowest a value of 4). Figure 3 d) shows how the
profile assignment varies by age and that older workers are systematically assigned to profiles
that correspond to lower expected job finding probabilities. Furthermore there is a small
jump around age 50, where the average profile index increases from around 2.2 to 2.3. It is
noteworthy that profile assignment may occur before or after an individual actually claims
UI benefits (it can happen when the worker first registers for job search for example which
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may be several months prior to the start of UI). As Figure 3 d) shows, the profile index does
not jump exactly at age 50, but rather shows a rapid increase from a few months before to a
few months after the age 50 cutoff. This suggests, that profile assignment may not actually
be related to an increase in UI benefits but rather a form of age discrimination where age 50
is a salient number and caseworkers may believe it harder for workers above that age cutoff
to find jobs. Of course this could also reflect age discrimination by potential employers who
may be biased against hiring workers older than age 50. Furthermore, it is important to note
that even in the presence of age discrimination, the validity of the RD design should not be
affected, which is only based on the age at claiming UI benefits. Since we are comparing
workers who claim benefits shortly before or after their 50th birthday, both groups will be
age 50 for most of their UI spell and in particular when they get closer to the exhaustion
point of UI benefits, thus even if employers discriminate against workers older than age 50
it would not have a differential effect on the treatment and control group in this design.20
The differences in profiles could however affect the actions of the caseworker throughout the
spell if the initial assessment affects the integration strategy of the caseworkers. Given that
we do not observe any significant differences this seems unlikely however.
Another important role for caseworkers is to monitor search efforts and sanction workers
who do not comply with job search requirements. While almost 20% of workers receive some
sanction at the beginning of the UI spell (translating to on average sanction duration of
about 5 days), this again does not change at the UI threshold.
Next we turn to assignments to active labor market programs. Figure 3 f) shows for
the most common program category – education programs – , how the average duration of
program participation (within the three months before and after start of UI receipt) varies
with the age of claiming UI benefits. The figure shows that there are no discontinuities at the
age cutoffs in any of the measures. For example, an unemployed person spends around 1.4
days per month of UI receipt in a training program, but this does not vary at the age cutoff.
This is also confirmed in Table 4 which shows no economically or statistically significant
differences at the age cutoff. Thus it does not appear that caseworkers compensate for the
differences in UI eligibility by targeting ALMP resources differently to workers with different
UI eligibility.
20Consistent with this, in section 5.5 we provide a placebo test, where we find no increase in nonemployment
duration at age 50 in a time period where there was no UI discontinuity at that age threshold.
19
5.4 Dynamic Effects of UI on Caseworker-Unemployed Interactions
Above we focused on caseworker interactions at the beginning of the UI spell in order to
isolate the caseworker response to UI eligibility from the mechanical effect that the duration
of contact between the caseworker and the UI recipient is changing. However, looking at how
initial average caseworker variables are changing at the age discontinuity may hide important
dynamic patterns. For example, one way how caseworkers might respond to potential UI
durations is by concentrating extra resources on workers close to the exhaustion point to help
these workers find a job before they run out of UI benefits. Similarly, caseworkers can help
the unemployed close to the exhaustion point by prolonging their duration on UI benefits
through active labor market programs, during which individuals may receive benefits even
after regular UI benefits are exhausted. We estimate how caseworker responses are changing
throughout the UI spell using the following regression model:
yit = βt + δt1(ai ≥ 50) + ft(ai) + θjt + εit | ti ≥ t (5)
ti is the month individual i is exiting UI and we estimate this equation for each month
t when individuals are on UI (t = 1, ..., 12). Thus the sample in each regression are all
individuals who are still in UI in month t. The outcome yit are caseworker interactions
of individual i in month t of the UI spell. θjt are team-by-quarter fixed effects separately
estimated for each duration t. Estimating equation (5) for each t provides a vector of βt which
represents the average caseworker interactions of individuals in month t just to the left of
the age discontinuity, while δt represents the discontinuous shift in the number of caseworker
interactions in that month. Plotting δt and βt+δt provides the level of interactions to the left
and the right of the cutoff and the estimated standard errors on δt allow for a straightforward
test of whether the levels of interactions change at the age discontinuity in each month.
One concern about these dynamic estimates is that while the RD design implies that
workers are comparable on both sides of the cutoff at the beginning of the UI spell, there
could be differential selection of who returns to work in the two groups. In that case the
composition of workers would change throughout the UI spell and we would not necessarily
be comparing similar workers in later months of UI. We address this in two ways: first we
show in Appendix Figure 10, that along a wide range of observables worker characteristics
change very little throughout the UI spell and do not appear to change differentially between
20
the two groups. We also reestimate all specifications below controlling for a vector of worker
characteristics in equation (5) and found virtually identical results (Appendix Figure 7 and
8).
Figure 4 a)-c) shows how caseworker contacts in the form of invitations to the UI agency,
vacancy referrals, and integration contracts change throughout the unemployment spell as
well as at the age discontinuity. Invitations (a) occur as early as 3 months before the start of
the UI spell, while 40 percent of the unemployed receive an invitation just prior to starting
on UI benefits and an additional 50 percent during the first month of UI benefits. Afterwards
invitations continue at a pace of about one in every three months. A similar patter can be
observed for vacancy referrals (c) with a spike early on in the UI spell and then about one
referral every three months. Most integration contracts (b) are signed right at the beginning
of the UI spell, with some occurring prior to that (presumably at the time when individuals
register for job search) or shortly afterwards. There are new integration contracts (or likely
rather updates to the existing contracts) later during the UI spell at a frequency of about 1
every 4 months.
Regarding differences at the age discontinuity, we observe relatively small and mostly
insignificant differences between the two groups later in the UI spell. There is a small
uptick in invitations in the 12 month group prior to benefit exhaustion which may be due
to workers being invited for a final meeting to discuss the upcoming benefit expiration. The
point estimates also suggest that workers below the age group are slightly less likely to
sign new integration contracts and receive vacancy referrals later on in the spell, but the
difference is very small (e.g. about 0.02 vacancies referred per month in month 6). It seems
hard to imagine that integration contracts or vacancy referrals would lead to a reduction
in the job finding hazard, so if anything these caseworker actions might actually counteract
the disincentive effect. This would suggest that the true disincentive effect revealed by the
higher reemployment hazard for workers with 12 months of UI (which is visible in Figure 2)
is perhaps biased downwards, but given the small difference in these resources (and that we
do not know that they are at all effective) this bias is likely very small.
In Figure 4 d) we show the average number of days UI recipients are sanctioned through-
out the UI spell. Sanctions are most likely right at the beginning, due to voluntary quits
or failure to register for job search in time. Afterwards they are less common and decline
over the UI spell, with around 0.5 days of sanctioned UI benefit days per month and no
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meaningful differences between the two groups. Thus it does not seem that caseworkers
attempt to counteract the disincentive effects of UI benefits through increased sanctioning
of the workers with higher eligibility.
Figure 4 e) shows the number of days spent in education or vocational training programs.
Participation in such programs increases initially, with a maximum around 4 months after
the start of receiving UI benefits. Interestingly there is a gap in time spent in education
programs in the 4 months prior to the exhaustion point with individuals with 12 months of
PBD participating about an extra 0.4 days per month. Participation in a training program
effectively allows for an extension of UI benefits, since an individual continues to receive UI
benefits while in a program (even if regular benefits are already exhausted) and if benefits
are not yet exhausted, each day in a training program only uses up half a day of UI eligibility.
Furthermore if an individual finishes a training program she can always receive UI benefits
for the remainder of the calendar month. This may create an incentive for the unemployed
to participate in training programs close to the UI exhaustion point or for the caseworker
to allocate slots in training programs to workers who otherwise might lose UI benefit soon.
While we cannot disentangle whether this is due to the caseworker shifting resources or due to
the unemployed seeking out training programs, overall the effect is quite small. Furthermore
it seems likely that participation in training programs decreases job finding probabilities at
least in the short run, since workers are likely not looking for jobs while in the program and
have fewer incentives to find a job right away. Thus this would again go in the opposite
direction of the disincentive effect of UI benefits and thus lead to a downward bias in the
estimated disincentive effect. Figure 4 f) shows similarly that there are no differences for
participation in private job placement services.
While the Figure 4 revealed a few small differences in integration contracts, vacancy
referrals and training programs for workers close to the exhaustion point, the differences are
small and, as discussed above, at most seem to suggest a slight downward bias in typical
moral hazard estimates of UI. Furthermore given that the results suggest that workers with
lower UI eligibility receive fewer contracts and vacancy referrals, while being more likely to
go into training programs, this does not point clearly towards the caseworkers either trying
to provide extra or less resources to this group. Given the small magnitudes and not very
clear pattern, our overall takeaway is that caseworkers do not or only to a very small degree
respond to UI eligibility and that this is unlikely to lead to a significant bias in measured
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disincentive effects.
5.5 Summary of Robustness and Heterogeneity Analysis
We conducted a wide range of robustness checks that we include in the online appendix and
only briefly summarize here. Overall our main finding that caseworker interactions are not
affected by PBD is remarkably robust and not affected by our choice of specification.
To check for potential (functional) misspecification in age, we varied the size of the age
window around the age threshold and included quadratic age polynomials separately on each
side of the cutoff. We also estimated all specifications using a rich set of control variables,
such as pre-unemployment wage, dummies for nationality, gender, children, marital status,
East Germany and six educational groups, the duration until UI take-up, actual experience,
occupational-, industry- and establishment tenure as well as seasonal (monthly) controls. We
also estimated all main specifications with and without team-quarter fixed effects. Further
checks use bias adjusted estimates with robust standard errors as proposed by Calonico et
al. (2014) and assess the sensitivity of not excluding values within one month at each side
of the cutoff.
For all specifications during the period with real treatment, the effect on duration of UI
benefits receipt – and for all but one specification for the effect on on nonemployment– are
positive, similar in size and mostly statistically significant. The estimates on caseworker
actions are in contrast insignificant and close to zero for almost all specifications with the
exception of small effects in some training program specifications and the assigned labor
market profile at UI entry. For the main caseworker actions (invitation to meetings as well
as provided vacancy referrals) the precision of the estimates rules out caseworker reactions
of economically meaningful size.
We also conducted a placebo test at the age threshold 50 for the years 2006 and 2007
(when PBD did now vary at this age threshold). There is no increase in UI benefit or nonem-
ployment durations at the age threshold in these placebo years suggesting that there are no
other confounding factors at the age threshold that would bias either the nonemployment
estimates or the caseworker estimates.
Finally we investigated whether there are heterogeneous treatment effects that might
cancel each other out in the aggregate. Imagine for example that caseworkers have a form of
gender bias that might let them behave like a “unemployment minimizer” toward one gender
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while as a “welfarist” towards the other gender, by pooling men and women it might appear
that caseworkers’ resource allocation is unaffected by UI benefits. To investigate this we split
our samples by a wide range of observable characteristics such as gender, pre-unemployment
wage, team size, and others we did not find noteworthy differences in these treatment effects
across the groups.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates one aspect of caseworker actions, namely whether they respond to
differences in UI eligibility across the unemployed. Our results suggest that caseworkers
do not seem to significantly change their behavior at the age discontinuity determining UI
eligibility, which may be surprising given that there are many possible motivations that
would lead to caseworkers adjusting their behavior as discussed in Section 2. In particular
it does not appear to be the case that caseworkers systematically shift resources to help
the disadvantaged unemployed with shorter UI durations, or to counteract the disincentive
effects of UI. The differences we documented in Figure 4 towards the end of the UI spell are
very small and do not point in a systematic direction. Our findings are thus consistent with
the stylized model of the bureaucratic caseworker laid out in the framework section, where
caseworkers follow either explicit or implicit guidelines regarding how to interact with the
unemployed in a way that is not responsive to the difference in UI generosity or the different
search behavior induced by it. Alternatively the findings would also be consistent with a
lack of awareness or salience of the differences in UI eligibility.
At least in this context it does not seem that caseworkers are using their resources to
minimize unemployment durations or to maximize welfare of the unemployed in a utilitarian
sense. A positive implication of this finding from a research perspective is that the typical
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for UI Spells Age 48 to 52
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Eligigible Age 48/49 Age 50/51
Spells for max PBD and max PBD and max PBD
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.47
Non-German 0.091 0.076 0.077 0.074
Age in Years 49.9 50.0 48.9 51.0
Education in Years 11.1 11.2 11.2 11.2
Unemployment and UI Duration
Nonemployment Duration in Months (cap 36 Months) 19.3 18.4 17.6 19.2
[15.1] [15.0] [14.9] [15.0]
Nonemployment duration capped at 18 months 11.5 11.2 10.8 11.5
[6.95] [6.96] [6.96] [6.94]
Duration of UI Receipt (net) 7.00 7.08 6.44 7.77
[5.35] [5.47] [4.95] [5.90]
Pre- and Post UI Characteristics
Next Daily Earnings after Unemployment 52.5 54.7 55.1 54.3
[31.1] [31.8] [32.2] [31.4]
Last Daily Earnings prior to Unemployment 57.0 63.1 63.7 62.6
[42.0] [41.5] [41.5] [41.6]
Maximum UI Duration (imputed) 12.6 13.4 12 15
[2.97] [1.50] [0] [0]
Probability of Leaving Unemp. within first 18 Months 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.54
[0.50] [0.50] [0.49] [0.50]
Invitations amd Referrals
Number of Invitations during UI Receipt 3.18 3.25 3.17 3.32
Number of Contracts during UI Receipt 2.20 2.33 2.26 2.40
Number of Referrals during UI Receipt 2.17 2.42 2.44 2.39
Profile Assignment
Market Profile at Beginning of UI Spell 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.14
Activation Profile at Beginning of UI Spell 0.095 0.11 0.12 0.097
Support Profile at Beginning of UI Spell 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.27
Development Profile at Beginning of UI Spell 0.026 0.022 0.019 0.026
Active Labor Market Programs
Number of Days in Training Programms when on UI 13.7 15.1 15.6 14.5
Number of Days in Placement Services when on UI 4.55 4.74 4.00 5.54
Team-Related Characteristics
Mean N per Team 347.5 359.1 362.2 355.8
Mean N between age 45 and 55 per Team 70.2 72.6 73.1 72.1
At least one worker on both sides of cutoff 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98
Number of observations 138272 98405 50880 47525
Notes: This Table summarizes the data for all UI entries from April 2008 to June 2010 where the worker age at the
time of claiming UI was >= 48 and < 52 years. Column (1) shows all individuals with age between 48 and 52. Column
(2) restricts this to workers who have worked at least 3 years during the last 5 years and took up UI benefits within 3
months after job loss, which assures that they are eligible to the maximum potential benefit duration (PBD) on each
side of the cutoff. Standard deviations for selected variables are shown in brackets.
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Table 2: The Relationship Between Team Caseload
and Caseworker Assistance
(1) (2)




















Number of Team-Quarters 2637763 2637763
Team FE x x
Quarter FE x x
Controls x
Notes: Standard errors clustered on the team-level († P<.1,
* P<.05, ** P<.01)).
This table shows regressions of intensity of caseworker as-
sistance on the number of UI inflows (caseload) per team-
quarter. Regressions are weighted by team size. Controls
are mean values for female, non-german nationality, pre-
unemployment wage, experience and education.
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Table 3: The Effect of Potential UI Durations on UI and Nonemployment
Duration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unemp Ins. Duration Non-Emp Exit Exit
Benefit Nonemp Duration Prob Prob
Duration to emp topcoded at 15 Mon 18 Mon
18 Months
Increase in Potential UI Dur. from 12 to 15 Months
D(Age above Cutoff) 1.00 0.42 0.22 -0.031 -0.014
[0.080]** [0.12]** [0.10]* [0.0073]** [0.0073]†
dy
dP 0.33 0.14 0.075 -0.010 -0.0047
[0.027]** [0.041]** [0.034]* [0.0024]** [0.0024]†
Effect relative to mean 0.14 0.058 0.020 -0.058 -0.025
R2 .2057 .2816 .1855 .1903 .1936
Adjusted R2 .0575 .0993 .0335 .0393 .0431
Observations 98405 59965 98405 98405 98405
Mean of Dep. Var. 7.08 7.12 11.2 0.53 0.57
Notes: Standard errors clustered on day level († P<.1, * P<.05, ** P<.01)).
Coefficients from RD regressions with a bandwidth of 2 years but excluding observations
within 1 month on each side. Local linear regressions with different slopes on each side of
cutoff controlling for caseworker-team by quarter fixed effects.
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Table 4: Potential UI Duration on Assistance in Job-Search
Caseworker Assistance and Search Selectivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Number of Number of Looking for
Invitations Signed Contracts Job referrals part and
fulltime jobs
D(Age above Cutoff) 0.0062 0.011 -0.026 -0.00088
[0.018] [0.013] [0.033] [0.0032]
Effect relative to mean 0.0034 0.0078 -0.020 -0.013
Observations 98405 98405 98405 98405
Mean of Dep. Var. 1.83 1.35 1.27 0.066
Profile Assignments, Sanctions, and Active Labor Market Programs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labor Market Fraction Days in Days in
Profile of Sanctions Placement Training
Index at UI entry Services Programs
D(Age above Cutoff) 0.11 -0.0046 -0.0025 0.031
[0.019]** [0.0061] [0.13] [0.26]
Effect relative to mean 0.051 -0.022 -0.0021 0.0061
Observations 52098 98405 98405 98405
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.22 0.21 1.20 5.07
Notes: Standard errors clustered on day level († P<.1, * P<.05, ** P<.01)).
Local linear regressions with different slopes on each side of cutoff controlling for caseworker-
team by quarter fixed effects.
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Age at Start of Unemployment Spell
Leave-Out Mean Durnonemp
(f) Nonemp Duration
Notes: This figure shows team level leave-out means of different characteristics of UI recipients by
age on the team-quarter level. Binsize is 60 days.
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Reemployment Hazards by Month





0 5 10 15 20
Month since UI claim
12 Months Potential UI Duration 15 Months Potential UI Duration
Number P=12: 50880, Number P=15: 47525
Survival in Nonemployment by Month
(d) Survivor Function
Notes: Panels (a) and (b) show cross-sectional RD plots for the number of days in UI benefit
receipt (a) and the number of days in nonemployment capped at 18 months (b) controlling for team
x quarter fixed effects. The binsize is set to 60 days. Panel (c) shows the monthly hazard function
for for the two eligibility durations estimated at the cutoff (via pointwise RD regressions). Panel (d)
shows the corresponding survival functions. Where the hazard and survival function are statistically
significantly different from each other the figures shows vertical bars between the two lines.
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Age at Start of Unemployment Spell
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Age at Start of Unemployment Spell
totdays3m_days_education
(f) Days in Training Programms
Notes: This figure shows cross-sectional RD plots for caseworker contacts around the age cutoff
50. The outcome variables are measured as number of contacts per month from 3 months prior to
UI entry up to four months after UI entry for Figure a) - c). and the assigned index value of the
four relevant labor market profiles (where one means good prospects and four bad prospects) at the
beginning UI entry for figure d). The binsize is set to 60 days.
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Figure 4: The Effect of Potential UI Durations on Caseworker Interactions Through-
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Days per month in education programms by Month
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Days per month in placement services by Month
(f) Placement Services
Notes: This figure shows estimated counseling/monitoring intensities over the spell of UI benefit
receipt (conditioned on receiving still UI benefits) for both eligibility durations. The blue solid
line indicate estimates for 12-, the red dashed line estimates for the 15 months eligibility duration.
Vertical bars indicate significant differences on the 5% significance level for the respective months.
Figure a) - c) shows the number of interactions per months on UI, figure d) - f) number of days in
the respective month. The regressions control for fixed effects on the team x quarter-level.
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